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of the trust may be distributed, in the discretion of the
trustee, to a person who is living when the trust is
created.”19  Litigation will likely be necessary to establish
whether the revised Alaska rule against perpetuities applies
to land located in another state.  In our April 11, 1997,
article,20 we noted that trusts holding land are generally
governed by the law of the state where the land is located.21
•  Alaska is one of the few states with no state income
tax which permits funds not distributed to accumulate free
of state income tax.
•  As we noted in the April 25, 1997, article on asset
protection trusts,22 the cost to establish an off-shore trust
can run into five figures.23  Trusts set up under the 1997
Alaska statute should be substantially less costly to
establish and administer.
Disadvantages of “Alaska” trust
Although the Alaska statute offers notable advantages,
trusts established and maintained under that law fall
substantially short of the off-shore trusts in protecting trust
assets.
Under the new Alaska provision, the statute of
limitations for a fraudulent conveyance is generally four
years from the later of the date the transfer is made or one
year after the transfer is or reasonably could have been
discovered.24  By contrast, for trusts set up in the Cook
Islands, actions must be brought by the later of two years
after the creditor’s cause of action accrues or one year of the
transfer of the assets.25
While some of the off-shore jurisdictions bidding for
asset protection trusts do not recognize foreign judgments,26
a judgment from another state in the United States would be
enforceable in Alaska.  Moreover, a bankruptcy court would
be able to assert jurisdiction over an Alaska trustee.
In conclusion
The question now is whether other states will follow the
lead of Alaska in establishing more of a snug harbor for
asset protection trusts than heretofore has been available in
the United States.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PERMISSIVE USE. The predecessors in interest to
the properties owned by the parties had agreed that each
could use land owned by the other that was more
convenient for each to use. The disputed property in the
case was used by the defendant for farming and the
plaintiff used an equivalent amount of the defendant’s
land for farming. The defendant sought to build a road on
the disputed property and the plaintiff sought an injunction
against trespass and quiet title to the disputed property.
The defendant counter-claimed that the defendant owned
the property either under the original agreement of the
predecessors in interest or by adverse possession. The
court held that the original agreement was a swap for use
agreement since neither party ever claimed ownership of
the exchanged properties. Therefore, the defendant’s use
of the property was permissive and no title could pass by
adverse possession. Strubberg v. Roethemeyer, 941
S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had filed for
Chapter 13 and included anticipated federal income tax
refunds in the proposed payments of creditors. However,
the IRS withheld the refund for transfer to another
governmental agency in an administrative setoff. The IRS
had not filed a claim in the bankruptcy case, nor had the
IRS been notified about the bankruptcy case. The court
held that the withholding of the refund violated the
automatic stay; however, because the IRS was not aware
of the bankruptcy case, the violation was not willful and
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no damages would be awarded. The case does not mention
whether the refunds were recoverable by the estate. In re
LaFanette, 208 B.R. 394 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had owned a one-third
interest in a corporation which had qualified as a minority
contractor of government services because the other two-
thirds interests were owned by women. After an internal
dispute, one of the other shareholders left the company. In
order to maintain the minority status of the corporation,
the debtor transferred the debtor’s interest to the debtor’s
spouse. The stock had little value at the time of the
transfer. The court found that the debtor then learned that
the debtor’s income tax liability for that year was
substantially larger than expected and the debtor was
unable to pay the taxes due, although the debtor filed an
accurate income tax return. The debtor was in continuous
contact with the IRS in negotiating payment of the tax
debt but the taxes remained unpaid when the debtor filed
for bankruptcy. The IRS sought to have the taxes declared
nondischargeable because the debtor willfully attempted
to evade payment by hiding the stock from the IRS by
transferring it to the spouse. The court found that the stock
transfer was not made with any intent to evade payment of
the taxes because the debtor did not realize the amount of
taxes owed until after the transfer and the debtor
transferred the stock for a business reason. Therefore, the
taxes were dischargeable in bankruptcy. In re Huber, 97-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,498 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1997).
ENVIRONMENT
CLEAN WATER ACT. The plaintiffs were several
environmental groups and Indian tribes who sought a
declaratory judgment that applicants for federal grazing
permits be required to obtain certification from the state
that grazing activity would not adversely impact state
water quality. The plaintiffs argued that the U.S. Forest
Service was violating Section 401(a) of the Clean Water
Act (CWA) by issuing grazing permits without first
requiring the permitee to obtain certification from the state
of Oregon that the grazing would not violate state water
quality standards. The court held that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring the action because the plaintiffs lived
and recreated in the area involved and because the
plaintiffs showed that cattle grazing caused pollution of
streams near the grazing. The court also held that the
CWA allowed private suits to enforce permit conditions
affecting water quality violations. The central issue in the
case was whether the terms “any discharge into navigable
waters” under Section 401 was limited to point source
pollution. The court held that the pollution from cattle
grazing was governed by the CWA and that the Forest
Service was required to seek state certification of
compliance with water quality standards before issuing
grazing permits. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v.




BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued a proposed
regulation changing Virginia from a modified accredited
state to an accredited-free state. 62 Fed. Reg. 34612 (June
27, 1997).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC announced approval
for reinsurance and subsidy for the insurance of cotton,
grain sorghum and spring wheat in select states and
counties under the Crop Revenue Coverage plan of
insurance. 62 Fed. Reg. 35118 (June 30, 1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the macadamia nut Endorsement in the Common
Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement
provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg.
35662 (July 2, 1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the macadamia nut tree Endorsement in the
Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 35666 (July 2, 1997).
GYPSY MOTH. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations amending the gypsy moth quarantine
regulations by adding areas in Ohio and West Virginia to
the list of generally infested areas, in order to impose
certain restrictions on the interstate movement of regulated
articles to prevent the artificial spread of gypsy moth. 62
Fed. Reg. 36645 (July 9, 1997).
   PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT. The debtor was a corporation which operated or
franchised restaurants and which had purchased perishable
agricultural commodities from a supplier but had not paid
for all the purchases. The supplier sought relief from the
automatic stay to pursue collection of the unpaid amount
from the PACA trust fund, which was excludible from the
bankruptcy estate. The debtor argued that it was not a
dealer, broker, or retailer of agricultural commodities
subject to PACA. The court held that the debtor was not
subject to PACA because the debtor was not a dealer of
agricultural commodities but instead used the
commodities in the production of other goods and
services, restaurant meals. For a contrary holding, see
Matter of Magic Restaurants, Inc., 197 B.R. 455 (Bankr.
D. Del. 1996), app. denied, 202 B.R. 24 (D. Del. 1996) p.
3 supra. In re Italian Oven, Inc., 207 B.R. 839 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1997).
SUGAR. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
which redefine the crop year for the sugar loan program
from the current period, July 1 through June 30, to the
federal fiscal year, October 1 through September 30. The
proposed rule also would extend the loan availability
period to the whole fiscal year instead of ending the
availability period on June 30. The restriction that the
108                                                                                                                                                            Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
CCC could only make loans in July, August, and
September on sugar processed from sugarcane or sugar
beets that are normally harvested in those months would
be removed. The proposed rule would also eliminate
obsolete provisions governing the 1995 crop year price
support program and producer protections and revise the
information collection requirements to reflect the
simplified monthly data-reporting forms and the transfer
of reporting items to new annual reporting forms. 62 Fed.
Reg. 34611 (June 27, 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent had
created a grantor trust which provided for passage of a
remainder interest in the trust to a charitable foundation.
The trust assets included paintings and furnishings in a
residence. The estate could not claim a charitable
deduction for the entire value of the assets passing to the
charitable foundation and the heir claimed the unused
charitable deduction on the heir’s personal income tax
returns for the three years after the decedent’s death. The
court held that the charitable deduction was personal to the
decedent, who contributed the assets to the trust, and any
unused charitable deduction expired upon the death of the
decedent. Stussy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-293.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  The taxpayer issued two
$100,000 checks, one to each of the taxpayer's  two
children and the children signed no-interest demand notes
for repayment of the money. However, the taxpayer
testified that the taxpayer had no intention of seeking
repayment but intended to forgive the indebtedness over
several years. In the subsequent years, the taxpayer sent
letters to the children indicating how much of the loans
was forgiven. The court held that the initial checks were
gifts and not loans, based on several factors: (1) no interest
was charged; (2) no security was required; (3) although
the notes had fixed maturity dates, the taxpayer did not
intend to enforce them; (4) no demand was made for
repayment; (5) no repayments were made; (6) the taxpayer
did not provide any evidence that the children had
sufficient income or assets to repay the notes; (7) the
"loans" were not consistently treated as such in the
taxpayer's records; and (8) the taxpayer did not file gift tax
returns for the loan forgiveness amounts in excess of the
annual exclusion amount. The appellate decision affirming
the Tax Court is designated as not for publication. Miller
v. Comm'r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,277 (9th
Cir. 1997), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-3.
JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY. The decedent’s
predeceased spouse had inherited real property and
transferred the property to both of them as tenants by the
entirety in 1955. The spouse died in July 1989 and 50
percent of the value of the property was included in the
spouse’s estate. The decedent sold the property in 1990
and used the estate tax value for 50 percent of the property
(under the “fractional share” rule) as the basis for
determining gain from the sale. The decedent’s executor
filed an amended income tax return for the year of the sale
to use a basis of the full estate tax value of the property,
under the “consideration furnished rule,” removing all
gain from the sale transaction. The issue was whether the
ERTA 1981 amendments to I.R.C. § 2040 providing for
the fractional share rule replaced the former
“consideration furnished” rule for pre-1977 joint tenancy
transfers. The court cited Gallenstein v. United States, 975
F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1992) to support its holding that the
1981 amendment did not completely replace the previous
rule and the decedent was entitled to include the entire
value of the property for estate tax purposes as the
property’s basis in the sale.  Patten v. United States, 97-2
U.S. Tax Cdas. (CCH) ¶ 60,279 (4th Cir. 1997), aff’g,
96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,231 (W.D. Va. 1996).
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The decedent had
created a trust with the spouse as a remainder beneficiary.
The trust contained a testamentary power of appointment
for the spouse over the trust principal but the trust
language was ambiguous as to whether the power was
limited or not. After the death of the decedent, the
surviving spouse petitioned the state probate court for an
interpretation of the trust that only a limited power of
appointment was intended by the decedent. The probate
court ruled that the surviving spouse had only a limited
testamentary power of appointment over trust principal.
The IRS ruled that the probate court’s ruling was
consistent with state law and that the spouse had a limited
power of appointment. Ltr. Rul. 9725031, March 24,
1997; Ltr. Rul. 9725033, March 24, 1997.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
The decedent had transferred the decedent’s residence,
valued at $1.3 million, to the decedent’s sons for a
promissory note for $337,000, with a retained life estate
for the decedent. The sons’ income from the family
corporation was insufficient to make the payments on the
note until the decedent forgave one year’s payment and
increased the sons’ compensation and bonuses from the
corporation. The decedent also transferred the note to the
corporation. The note was paid off by the time of the
decedent’s death due to large bonuses paid to the sons.
The District Court had held that the value of the residence,
less the amounts paid by the sons, was included in the
gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a) because the
consideration for the transfer was only 26 percent of the
full value of the property. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the value of the retained interest could be
determined using the actuarial tables of Treas. Reg. §
25.2512(A), based on the decedent’s life expectancy;
therefore, the amount paid by the sons was adequate
consideration. The appellate court held that the phrase
“adequate and full consideration” in I.R.C. § 2036(a) is to
be applied in reference to the actuarial value of the
remainder interest transferred. The court determined that
the transfer of the ranch was a bona fide sale for full and
adequate consideration. Wheeler v. U.S., 97-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,278 (5th Cir. 1997), rev’g, 96-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,226 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
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VALUATION. The decedent had been the
beneficiary of a trust created by the decedent. Two months
before the decedent’s death and when the decedent was
known to be terminally ill, the trustees transferred the
trusts’ assets to a new limited partnership in exchange for
an 82 percent limited partnership interest. Other family
members and trusts for family members purchased the
remaining 18 percent interests in the partnership in
exchange for cash and other assets. The estate valued the
estate’ partnership interest at 62 percent of the total value
of partnership assets, claiming a discount for the partial
interest because of the restrictions on the sale of the
interest under state partnership law and the partnership
agreement. The IRS ruled that the restrictions were to be
disregarded for estate tax valuation purposes because
family members held substantial interests in the property
before and after contribution to the partnership. This and
other recently reported rulings indicate that the IRS will
challenge attempts to affect the valuation of estate assets
by transferring them into limited partnership interests
within a short period before the decedent’s death. Ltr.
Rul. 9725002, March 3, 1997.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CASUALTY LOSSES. The President has declared
certain areas of Mississippi as disaster areas from Feb. 28,
1997 flooding. Losses from these casualties may be
deducted in taxpayers’ 1996 returns.
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[1].*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned
a livestock company which allowed an employee to cash
company checks written to ficticious persons. The
taxpayer claimed that the employee embezzled the money
but the evidence demonstrated that the checks were cashed
with the taxpayer’s knowledge and consent. The evidence
also showed that the employee did not keep the money;
therefore, the amount of the checks was a constructive
dividend to the taxpayer. Reaves Livestock, Inc. v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-283.
REORGANIZATION. A farming S corporation was
owned by two brothers and their families. Because of a
management dispute, the shareholders agreed to divide the
business assets and form two separate corporations, each
owned by one brother and his family. The reorganization
was accomplished by establishing a second corporation,
distributing one half of the assets to the new corporation in
exchange for stock and distributing the stock to the one
brother and family in exchange for their stock in the
original corporation. The IRS ruled that the reorganization
was a qualified “type D” reorganization which did not
cause recognition of gain or loss from the exchanges and
did not terminate the S corporation election of the original
corporation from the momentary ownership of the stock of
the new corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9726013, March 28, 1997.
STOCK REDEMPTION. The taxpayer owned 100
percent of the stock of a corporation which operated a car
dealership. The employees of the business approached the
taxpayer about purchasing the business. At a time when
the business was worth $735,000, the employees paid the
taxpayer that amount but characterized the payments as
$500,000 for the stock and $235,000 as compensation for
the taxpayer’s past services to the corporation. The
corporation then deducted the $235,000 as wages.
However, the corporation did not withhold or pay social
security or income taxes on the $235,000 and gave the
taxpayer a Form 1099 MISC and not a W-2 Form. The
court held that the $235,000 was not deductible because
the amount was actually compensation for the stock
received by the employees. Twin City Dodge-Chrysler,
Inc. v. United States, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,483 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4]. * The taxpayer was
a corporation which operated a horse racing and breeding
activity. On December 28, 1984, the taxpayer purchased
the assets of a decedent’s estate which included the stock
of another corporation and the personal assets of the
estate. The taxpayer continued the purchased corporation
as a subsidiary. On January 15, 1985, the taxpayer
transferred the estate personal property, which included
353 horses, to the subsidiary retroactively, effective on the
date the property was purchased from the estate,
December 28, 1984. The taxpayer claimed a full year of
depreciation for the horses, arguing that the temporary
ownership of the horses gave the taxpayer a sufficient
ownership interest to claim depreciation. The court held
that the true ownership of the horses, as established by the
taxpayer’s own actions, was that the horses were owned
by the subsidiary which was entitled to only one month of
deprecation in 1984. The appellate decision is designated
as not for publication. Jack Kent Cooke, Inc. v. United
States, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,511 (4th Cir.
1997), aff’g, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,483 (E.D.
Va. 1996).
The IRS has issued guidance for making the general
asset account election under I.R.C. § 168(I)(4) for certain
property placed in service in taxable years ending before
October 11, 1994. The election procedures are applicable
only for changes in accounting methods occurring in
taxable years ending in 1996 or 1997. Rev. Proc. 97-30,
I.R.B. 1997-25, 20.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer
was a partnership which purchased and improved real
property. The taxpayer borrowed money from a bank for
the purchase and improvements. The bank agreed to
refinance the project by reducing the principal on the loan
to the fair market value of the property. The bank required
the taxpayer to sell the property as part of the refinancing
agreement. The taxpayer argued that the reduction of the
principal was discharge of indebtedness income. The court
held that the refinancing was considered part of a sale of
the property, resulting in recognition of gain to the extent
that the amount of reduced principal exceeded the
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taxpayer’s basis in the property.  2925 Briarpark, Ltd. v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-298.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS. The taxpayer
operated a citrus tree nursery. The trees were destroyed in
1985 as part of a state citrus canker eradication program
and the taxpayer received $8,000 in compensation for the
destroyed trees. The taxpayer claimed the proceeds as gain
on the 1985 return but did not make the election for
deferral of gain under I.R.C. § 1033. The taxpayer took
part in a law suit for additional compensation. The
taxpayer received $105,000 in 1991 in additional
compensation for the destroyed trees. The taxpayer
claimed the $105,000 as gain on the 1991 return and made
the election for deferral of gain based on the purchase of
new business property with the lawsuit award. The
taxpayer argued that, because the gain was realized in two
separate payments, the taxpayer was entitled to two
separate periods in which to make the Section 1033
election. The court held that the statute did not provide for
more than one two year period for purchase of
replacement property; therefore, the second payment did
not start a new two year replacement period. Because the
replacement property was purchased more than two years
after the original compensation award payment, no
deferral of gain was allowed. The court noted that the
taxpayer could have made the election with the first
payment and sought an extension of the two year
replacement period to allow the taxpayer to take advantage
of the deferral when the second payment was received.
Shipes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-304.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in June 1997,
the weighted average is 6.87 percent with the permissible
range of 6.18 to 7.35 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.18 to 7.56 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining
the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).
Notice 97-35, I.R.B. 1997-25, 32.
PREPAID EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a
corporation which operated a business raising broiler
chickens. In 1987, the corporation paid $20 million for
feed and feed ingredients and deducted the entire amount
in 1987, although only a portion of the feed was used in
1987. The IRS disallowed the deduction for the feed not
used, under I.R.C. § 464(f), because the corporation was
not an individual farmer. The IRS argued that the
corporation was not a “qualified farm-related taxpayer”
because the IRS interpreted the term “taxpayer,” as
defined by I.R.C. § 464(f)(3)(B), to include only
individuals. The court held that the statute was ambiguous
in failing to precisely define the scope of the term
“taxpayer.” The court examined the legislative history and
concluded that the Congress allowed an exception to the
prepaid expense limitations of I.R.C. § 464 to full-time
farming activities and did not make any distinction
between individuals and entities engaged in full-time
farming activities. Therefore, the court held that the
corporation was entitled to currently deduct all the prepaid
feed expenses because the corporation was actively
involved in full-time farming activities. Neil Harl will
publish an article on this case in a future issue of the
Digest. Golden Rod Farms, Inc. v. United States, 97-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,507 (11th Cir. 1997).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
BASIS. The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of an S
corporation which sold its interest in a project to another
unrelated corporation for stock in that corporation. The S
corporation used the cash method of accounting. The S
corporation board of directors made a resolution to pay the
taxpayer a commission on the transaction; however, the
commission was not paid. The S corporation sold the
stock back to the other corporation at a taxable gain and
included the commission in the basis of the stock to the S
corporation for purposes of computing the taxable gain
passed through to the taxpayer. The court held that the
commission could not be included in the S corporation’s
basis of the stock resold to the other corporation because
the commission was not actually paid in the year of the
sale. Haymond v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-289.
BUILT-IN GAINS. The taxpayer was a C corporation
which owned timber land. The taxpayer harvested timber
from the land for use in the taxpayer’s manufacturing
business. The corporation planned to make an S
corporation election and an election under I.R.C. § 631(a)
under which timber cut under a contract can be treated as
sold or exchanged in the year the timber is cut. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer’s gain under I.R.C. § 631(a) during
the built-in gains recognition period of I.R.C. § 1374 was
not subject to the tax of Section 1374. The IRS also ruled
that the taxpayer’s income from processing and selling
products from trees harvested during the recognition
period was not subject to the tax of Section 1374. Ltr.
Rul. 9726015, March 28, 1997.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer
was a shareholder in an S corporation which was a partner
in a joint venture which realized discharge of indebtedness
income in 1991. The taxpayer increased the basis of the
taxpayer’s S corporation stock by the taxpayer’s share of
the discharge of indebtedness income passed through the S
corporation. At the time of the discharge of the
indebtedness, the S corporation was insolvent and had net
operating losses. The increase in the stock basis enabled
the taxpayer to deduct the carried over losses in a later
year. The IRS argued that the discharge of indebtedness
income was not an item of income for purposes of
determining stock basis because discharge of indebtedness
income was excluded under the insolvency exclusion rule
of I.R.C. § 108. The court held that, under I.R.C. §
61(a)(12), discharge of indebtedness is an item of income
which increases a shareholder’s basis under I.R.C. § 1367.
The court did not discuss the effect of Section 108 on the
stock basis, because the issue was not raised by the IRS.
Winn v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-286.
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SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
July 1997
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.07 5.98 5.94 5.91
110% AFR 6.69 6.58 6.53 6.49
120% AFR 7.31 7.18 7.12 7.07
Mid-term
AFR 6.65 6.54 6.49 6.45
110% AFR 7.32 7.19 7.13 7.08
120% AFR 8.00 7.85 7.77 7.72
Long-term
AFR 6.99 6.87 6.81 6.77
110% AFR 7.70 7.56 7.49 7.44
120% AFR 8.41 8.24 8.16 8.10
TAX SHELTER. The taxpayer was a physician who
invested in a sheep breeding operation where the taxpayer
purported to sell sheep to the promoter of the operation.
The court found that the taxpayer knew nothing about
raising sheep and that the transactions involved were
shams since the promoter completely controlled the
operation and bore all the risk of loss. The taxpayer failed
to object to the purchase of dead sheep and failed to notice
that some of the the same sheep were listed in two
purchases. The taxpayer’s payment of substantial
maintenance and interest expenses was ignored because
the tax benefits were far greater than the taxpayer’s costs.
The court held that the deductions and credits claimed
from the investment were not allowable and that the
taxpayer was subject to the negligence penalty for
ignoring the advice of the taxpayer’s accountant, for
unreasonable reliance on the tax advice of the investment
promoter, and for not showing any substantial authority
for the deductions claimed. The appellate decision
affirming the Tax Court is designated as not for
publication. Anagnoston v. Comm’r, 97-1 U.S.Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,481 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’g, T.C. Memo.
1994-334.
WITHHOLDING. The taxpayer was an employee of
a public corporation which withheld income and social
security taxes from the taxpayer’s wages. The taxpayer
sought to recover the withheld taxes as improperly
withheld because the withholding rules applied only to
governmental employees and not private employees. The
court dismissed the case as frivolous and awarded the
employer double costs and attorney’s fees as a sanction.
The case is designated as not for publication. Hennigen v.
Taylor, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,487 (10th Cir.
1997).
LABOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. The plaintiffs were
agricultural workers employed by the defendant. The
defendant had informed the plaintiffs that they would be
paid on a piece basis instead of hourly wage. The plaintiffs
met as a group with their foreman to express their
dissatisfaction with the new method but agreed to try the
new method for a trial period. The defendant then
terminated the employment of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
brought an action for wrongful discharge, arguing that
they were discharged because of collectively discussing
their grievances. The court examined Oregon law for
existence of a recognized important public interest in
allowing workers to collectively express their grievances.
Although the court did not find a specific statute granting
that right or interest, the court held that the labor laws of
the state generally supported the right of workers to
collectively express grievances; therefore, the plaintiffs’
cause of action was allowable. Rauda v. Oregon Roses,
Inc., 935 P. 2d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONVERSION. The plaintiff was a livestock sales
company which sold cattle to a feedlot. The feedlot paid
for the cattle by check and, as arranged between the
parties, the plaintiff held the checks for two weeks before
cashing them. The feedlot resold some of the cattle and
deposited the proceeds in a bank account. The feedlot was
indebted to a bank which held security interests in the
feedlot’s inventory and other assets. The bank discovered
that the feedlot’s inventory was insufficient security for
the outstanding loans and offset the bank account funds
against the loan. The offset occurred before the plaintiff
attempted to cash the checks but after the feedlot
deposited the proceeds of the cattle purchased from the
plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the funds in the bank
account were traceable to the cattle not paid for by the
feedlot; therefore, the bank committed conversion when
the funds were offset. The court held that the plaintiff
failed to sufficiently identify any interest of the plaintiff in
the funds in the account at the time of the setoff because
the plaintiff could not exclusively trace the account funds
to the sale of the cattle. In addition, the plaintiff’s interest
in the proceeds was inferior to the bank’s perfected
security interest in the feedlot’s assets. Meyer v. Norwest
Bank Iowa, 112 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1997).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Cervin v. Comm’r, 111 F.3d 1252 (5th Cir.
1997), rev’g on another issue , T.C. Memo. 1994-550
(valuation) see p. 93 supra.
Estate of Shapiro v. Comm’r, 111 F.3d 1010 (2d
Cir. 1997) (installment payment of estate tax) see p. 76
supra.
Estate of Tenenbaum v. Comm’r, 112 F.3d 251 (6th
Cir. 1997), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-48 (marital
deduction) see p. 84 supra.
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2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 5-9, 1998 at the
spectacular ocean-front Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on
the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax
over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping
transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
   •  Ethics (2 hours).
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
group discount air fares on United Airlines, available
through Sun Quest Vacations. In addition, attendees are
eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort, the site of the seminar.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares
and insure availability of convenient flights at a busy travel
time of the year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
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